c26636204.2021.07.14
搭便车行为下多品牌多渠道的供应链博弈
Multi-brand and Multi-channel Supply Chain Game under Free-riding Behavior
网络渠道的发展,造成了以网络为主要销售渠道的网货品牌兴起,也使得传统品牌纷纷从零售模式开展网络渠道成为双渠道模式,整个零售市场发展成为传统品牌双渠道模式、BOPS模式与网货品牌直销模式的多种品牌不同渠道竞争市场。本文研究竞争市场中的双渠道供应链、网络直销供应链与网络下单门市速提的BOPS供应链,在搭便车行为影响下的定价博弈模型,得到供应链的成员在分散式决策与集中式决策下的最优定价策略,并发现各博弈方的最优定价,是关于渠道交叉及品牌交叉价格弹性系数的增函数,且渠道竞争的影响较品牌竞争更为显著。搭便车行为确实会影响最优定价及最优利润,网络渠道可藉由搭便车行为获利,零售渠道则因搭便车行为遭受损失。
关键词:双渠道供应链、品牌竞争、搭便车行为、网络下单门市速提、定价
The development of network channels has caused the rise of online brands with network as the main sales channel, and also made traditional brands develop network channels from retail mode to dual channel mode. The whole retail market has developed into a traditional brand dual-channel model, BOPS model and online brand direct sales model of a variety of brands different channels to compete in the market. This paper studies the pricing model of the competitive market with the dual-channel supply chain, the online direct sales supply chain and the supply chain of buy online and pick up in-store (BOPS) under the free-riding behavior, and then obtains the optimal pricing strategies of decentralized decision-making and centralized decision-making of each game player of the three supply chains. We also obtain that the optimal pricing of each game player is an increasing function of channel cross price elasticity coefficient and the brand cross price elasticity coefficients. Furthermore, the influence of channel competition is more significant than the brand competition. The optimal pricing and expected profits of each game player are influenced by free-riding behavior.
Keywords: Dual-channel Supply Chain, Brand Competition, Free-riding Behavior, Buy Online and Pick up in Store, Pricing