本文基于量子博弈的观点，考虑一个制造商通过网络直销与零售双渠道供应链销售产品，同时存在另一制造商仅通过网络直销渠道销售可替代产品，探讨品牌竞争下三个博弈方的定价策略。制造商间及双渠道供应链之间的竞合关系，可以视为一个量子纠缠现象，不论是在分散式或集中式决策下，当量子纠缠度大于零时，各博弈方量子博弈的最优利润皆高于经典博弈；当量子纠缠度趋于无穷时，量子博弈的最优价格与最优利润最后保持收敛，因此量子博弈理论是优于经典博弈理论的决策方法。数值模拟证明，分散决策降低了供应链的整体效率；各博弈方的最优利润是渠道交叉系数与品牌交叉系数的增函数，并且相对于品牌竞争，渠道竞争对双渠道供应链的影响更显著；当品牌忠诚度高于某一数值后，各博弈方的最优利润是品牌忠诚度的增函数。

关键词：量子博弈、经典博弈、双渠道供应链、量子纠缠度、定价

Based on the perspective of quantum games, this article studies the pricing strategies under brand competition among three game players, which are one manufacturer selling a product through an Internet and a retailer channels while another manufacturer selling a substitute product only through the Internet channel. The competitive relationship among three game players can be regarded as a quantum entanglement phenomenon. No matter under decentralized decision-making or centralized decision-making, each game player's optimal profit of quantum game is higher than that of classical game when the quantum entanglement is greater than zero. When the quantum entanglement approaches infinity, the optimal price and optimal profit of the quantum game finally converge. The numerical analysis shows that decentralized decision-making reduces the overall efficiency of the supply chain. The optimal profit of each player is an increasing function of the channel cross-price elasticity coefficient and the brand cross-price elasticity coefficient. Furthermore, for the dual-channel supply chain, channel competition has a greater impact than brand competition. When brand loyalty is higher than a certain value, the optimal profit of each player is an increasing function of brand loyalty.

Keywords: Quantum Game, Classical Game, Dual-channel Supply Chain, Quantum Entanglement, Pricing