Research on the Tripartite Game of Government, Enterprise, and Poor Households under Targeted Poverty Alleviation-Take Tieshan Town, Zhenghe County, Fujian Province as an Example

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Abstract: Based on the perspective of precision poverty alleviation, this article uses a large number of literature studies, combined with field investigations in Tieshan Town, Zhenghe County, Fujian Province, and uses game theory to construct a three-party game model between the government, enterprises, and poor households to study the willingness and interest relationship of the three to implement precision poverty alleviation. After summarizing the different consideration points of each subject, this article discusses the effects of China's targeted poverty alleviation policies and the problems that exist.

1. Introduction

Precision poverty alleviation refers to different poverty areas, their environments, and the existing conditions of different poor households, and then uses its scientific and effective procedures to accurately identify, assist and manage poverty alleviation targets. Because poverty has always been a chronic disease that plagues various countries, with the concept of "precise poverty alleviation", China has achieved good results in all aspects. In the implementation of poverty alleviation, however, some key problems will gradually be discovered. How to better target poverty alleviation is of vital importance to China's social development.

Liu (2017) pointed out that although the current international poverty alleviation work has achieved good results, there are still certain problems in the implementation of local governments. Xiao (2017) believes that the causes of poverty are complex and diverse. The phenomenon of poverty hinders the overall level of development and social progress of China, and is a shortcoming in the goal of building a well-off society in an all-round way. Li (2018) believes that there are many problems between the various subjects in the poverty alleviation work, so it is necessary to explore the possible root causes of the contradictions, and make the contradictions develop in the direction that is conducive to the development of poverty alleviation. Zhou *et al.* (2018) analyzed the deep-seated reasons for the problems in the distribution of interests of multiple subjects in the targeted poverty alleviation in rural China with corresponding countermeasures. Xu *et al.* (2016) believe that in the process of precision poverty alleviation, it is necessary to innovate its models and mechanisms to achieve healthy development. Li (2017) proposed the measures that local governments should implement from the perspective of administrative system reform and governance.

In order to fully implement the "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on Winning the Fight against Poverty" and the spirit of the Central Poverty Alleviation and Development Work Conference, further accelerate the speed of poverty alleviation for the poor and ensure that the overall goal of building a moderately prosperous society in 2020 is achieved, Fujian Province formulated and issued the "Implementation Opinions of the Fujian Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China

and the People's Government of Fujian Province on Promoting Targeted Poverty Alleviation and Winning the Fight against Poverty." In the grassroots front-line visits and surveys, it is found that the implementation of targeted poverty alleviation policies requires the cooperation and support of multiple forces. This article uses game analysis to explore the relationship between the government, enterprises, and poor households in the poverty alleviation environment.

2. An Overview of Poverty Alleviation in Tieshan Town, Fujian Province

In order to better study the interest relationship of the tripartite subjects in poverty alleviation work, the site of Tieshan Town, Zheng He County, Fujian Province is visited and poor households are deeply investigated. Tieshan Town is located at the junction of Fujian and Zhejiang in the northeast of Zheng He County. The town covers an area of 132.6 square kilometers and governs 14 villages with 24,000 persons (including about 5,000 in the township). The outgoing population is 8,400, accounting for 35% of the total population. In 2016, there were 132 households with 522 people in poverty-stricken households in Tieshan Town. By 2017, 90 households and 348 people had been lifted out of poverty, and the whole town had to be lifted out of poverty in 2018. According to the results of the 2016 statistics on poor households who have not been lifted out of poverty, the main causes of poverty are due to illness, disability and lack of labor. Among them, the number of impoverished households due to illness and disabilities accounts for 34.4% and 13.1% of the total households, respectively. The specific statistical results are shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Statistics on the survey results of precision poverty alleviation in Tieshan Town.

No	Administrative village	Number of poor		Distribution of Causes of Poverty								Poverty Alleviation Goal (people)		
		households	people	Due to				Lack of			other	2016	2017	2018
				illness	reading	disaster	disability	labor	funds	technology				
1	Iron Mountain Village	10	48	27.3		9.1	51.5		12.1			11	37	0
2	Dongjian Village	7	21	8.3				41.7	33.3	16.7		7	14	0
3	Nanjiang Village	9	37				8.8	41.2	20.6	14.7	14.7	22	15	0
4	Fenglin Village	12	49	4.3	10.9	6.5	8.7	13	21.7	26.1	8.7	15	34	0
5	Xiangxiang Village	4	15					100				5	10	0
6	Jiangshan Village	18	67	22.4		12.0	10.4	20.8	17.9	16.5		14	53	0
7	Zhangtuncun	13	43	26.1		34.8	13.0		17.4	8.7		7	36	0
8	Yuanshan Village	7	28	16.7		16.7		33.3	16.7		16.7	4	24	0
9	Daling Village	12	44	25.0		7.5	7.5	22.5	20	7.5	10.0	17	27	0
10	Luojiadi Village	5	19	18.8			18.8	25	37.5			3	16	0
11	Li Tunyang Village	5	16	70.6		11.8	17.6					3	13	0
12	Dahongcun	12	43	34.1	9.8		17.1	9.8	17.1	12.2		23	20	0
13	Gaolin Village	13	45	28.9	10.5		42.2		18.4			13	32	0
14	Banyang Village	5	18				40.0	20.0			40.0	16	2	0

In order to implement and realize targeted poverty alleviation, the three parties of the town have made corresponding measures and actions. The government conducts real-time supervision of the actions of enterprises in targeted poverty alleviation, so that each work action can be effectively implemented. For poor households, there will be dedicated government officials to conduct one-to-one or one-to-two docking mode for each. The poor households should follow up effectively; the local leading enterprises will provide assistance to enterprises. In 2018, for example, Tieshan Town enterprises placed more than 300 labor security posts in the first half of 2018 and 400 labor security posts in the second half of the year, mainly bamboo and wood enterprises. Subsidies are provided according to the size of the poor households' industries. Cities and counties have introduced discount or low-interest loan policies for enterprises and cooperatives that promote the development of poor households and for the purchase of agricultural products from poor households or hiring poor households as laborers. A certain number of subsidies will be given; poor households have also actively participated in the government's poverty alleviation and enterprise assistance activities, and positive responses from the three parties have made Tieshan Town's poverty alleviation activities successful.

3. Questions Raised

In the model under the joint action of the three parties, questions are raised such as: how should the government supervise for better regulation? Whether the enterprise is willing to help? Whether the poor households are willing to accept poverty alleviation? Whether the two parties can economically and quickly

find each other to form a cooperative relationship? How should all parties take measures to improve the efficiency and performance of implementing targeted poverty alleviation policies in order to achieve a win-win situation when all three parties have needs?

Only several domestic researches on the game relationship between the participants in the environment of the implementation of the precision poverty policy have been discovered in literature. It is necessary to conduct an in-depth study of the game between the government, the enterprise and the poor households involved in the implementation of the targeted poverty alleviation policy in order to analyze the conditions and results for achieving the equilibrium of the game, customize the corresponding action plan for each subject, and then design a coordination model among the three parties to effectively implement and optimize the targeted poverty alleviation policy.

4. Tripartite Game Model of Government, Enterprises, and Poor Households under Targeted Poverty Alleviation Policies

4.1. Related Definitions and Basic Assumptions of the Model

The implementation of the targeted poverty alleviation policy requires the attention and participation of the government, enterprises, and poor households. For the convenience of analysis, it is assumed that the model includes three main stakeholders: government, enterprise and poor households. The government side refers to local governments, including those local organizations that carry out supervision and poverty alleviation work. The enterprise side here mainly refers to organizations or institutions such as enterprises and cooperatives that are helping. The poor household side refers to the resources owned by individuals or families that can barely meet the basic needs of life but far from reaching the average living standard of a society. The poor also has lacked the minimum resources to maintain the minimum living needs, or even survive. At the same time, it is assumed that the government, enterprises and poor households participating in the game process are all rational economic people, that is, they all aim at maximizing their own interests. In addition, assuming that all three parties in the game know the opponent's strategy space and the corresponding effects. In the short-term equilibrium, they can be dealt with according to a static game with complete information and the Nash equilibrium solution can be obtained.

4.1.1. Government Strategy

We assume that the government has two strategies to choose from: one is "supervision", that is, to accurately identify the targets of poverty alleviation and invest a certain cost to supervise whether the enterprises in the assistance actions are truly helping. If the business side actively supports the work, the government will give the business side a certain amount of compensation or reward. Otherwise, the government will warn and punish it. The second is "non-regulation", that is, the government does not interfere with whether the business side is truly and actively doing the assistance work.

4.1.2. Corporate Strategy

The enterprise side also has two strategies: one is to "actively assist" by providing intellectual assistance, and actively carrying out practical technology, production skills, business management and other skills training to improve the self-development of poor households through jobs and training efforts for poor households. The second is "not actively helping" by not taking any action or not actively helping.

4.1.3. Poor Household Strategy

Farmers also have two strategies to choose from: accept and not accept. Accepting poverty alleviation program will receive indirect economic subsidies from the enterprise. Not accept poverty alleviation program will get no economic subsidies, and will lead to a vicious circle because of poverty.

Here are the following assumptions about the benefits and costs of the government, enterprises, and poor households under different strategies:

Hypothesis 1: The enterprise is not active in providing assistance, all income is R_E, and all costs are C_E.

Under the premise of government supervision, if the enterprise does not actively provide assistance, it will be punished by the government L_E; When providing assistance, all income is R_E^*, and all costs are C_E^*. Under the environment of implementing targeted poverty alleviation policies, as a result of active response and participation in the action, government subsidies, corresponding investment or positive influence on I_E can be obtained.

Hypothesis 2: For the government, in addition to L_E and I_E, C_G represents the direct cost invested by the government in the process of supervision and assistance, and C_G^* is the indirect cost; L_G represents the various negatives caused by the government's failure to conduct effective supervision, the loss caused by the inability of resources to allocate benefits reasonably.

Hypothesis 3: The indirect benefit of poor households receiving active support from the enterprise is R_P, and if they receive indirect support from the enterprise, the indirect benefit is R_P^*. When receiving assistance, the government will give direct economic industrial subsidies to I_P.

4.2. Tripartite Game Strategy Combination and Utility Matrix of Government, Enterprise and Poor Households

Based on the above assumptions and definitions, we can establish a tripartite game model of government, enterprises and poor households under the targeted poverty alleviation policy (Figure 1).


Figure 1. Three-party game tree

The income results in the game matrix correspond to the enterprise side, the poor household side, and the government side by row (Table 2).

Table 2. Income results.

		Poor households Accept (P₁)	Poor households Not accept (P₂)
Government Supervision (G₁)	Enterprise Help (E₁)	$R_E^*-C_E^*+I_E$ R_P+I_P $-C_G-I_E-I_P-C_G^*$	$-C_E^*+I_E$ 0 $-C_G-I_E-C_G^*$
	Enterprise Not help (E₂)	$R_E-C_E-L_E$ R_P^* $L_E-C_G-L_G-C_G^*$	$-C_E-L_E$ 0 $L_E-C_G-L_G-C_G^*$
Government Not regulated (G₂)	Enterprise Help (E₁)	$R_E^*-C_E^*$ R_P 0	$-C_E^*$ 0 0
	Enterprise Not help (E₂)	R_E-C_E R_P^* $-L_G$	$-C_E$ 0 $-L_G$

5. An Equilibrium Analysis of the Tripartite Game between Government, Enterprise, and Poor Household

5.1. Analysis of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium

From an economic point of view, the business side is actively assisting, the government will tend to not supervise in order to reduce the subsidies and supervision costs for the business side and the poor. Therefore, strategy combination 1 (actively assist, accept, and supervise) and strategy combination 2 (actively assist, not accept, and supervise) will not naturally become a pure strategy equilibrium. This three-party game model has 6 pure strategy Nash balanced results (Table 3).

Table 3. Pure strategy Nash equilibrium conditions and results.

Strategy	Condition	Strategy portfolio
3	$R_E-C_E-L_E>R_E^*-C_E^*+I_E$ $R_P^*>0$ $L_E-C_G-C_G^*>0$	(Do not actively assist, accept, supervise)
4	$R_E-C_E-L_E>R_E^*-C_E^*+I_E$ $R_P^*<0$ $L_E-C_G-C_G^*>0$	(Not actively assisting, not accepting, supervising)
5	$R_E-C_E<R_E^*-C_E^*$ $R_P>0$	(Actively assist, accept, and not supervise)
6	$C_E>C_E^*$ $R_P<0$	(Actively provide assistance, do not accept or supervise)
7	$R_E-C_E>R_E^*-C_E^*$ $R_P^*>0$ $L_E-C_G-C_G^*<0$	(Do not actively assist, accept, and not supervise)
8	$C_E<C_E^*$ $R_P^*<0$ $L_E-C_G-C_G^*<0$	(Do not actively assist, accept, or supervise)

For Strategic combination 6 (active assistance, no acceptance, no supervision), the equilibrium condition is $C_E>C_E^*$ and $R_P<0$, indicating that the cost of providing active assistance services is lower than the cost of providing non-active assistance services. Since the early-stage construction of the assistance project requires a large amount of investment, it does not match the actual situation. However, due to the large costs involved in the construction of the preliminary assistance work, the prices of various resources that need to be invested in the assistance work are too high. Too few resources, unbalanced supply and demand, etc. make the income of the poor households who choose to actively assist is negative. For the poor, the best choice is not to accept.

Strategic combination 5 (actively assisting, accepting, not supervising) is the best strategic combination among the six strategies, and its establishment condition is $R_E-C_E<R_E^*-C_E^*$ and $R_P>0$, indicating that the enterprise chooses to actively assist the benefits of the strategy will be greater than the benefits of choosing the non-active support strategy. The enterprise will choose the active support strategy. At the same time, the income of the poor households who choose to accept the active poverty alleviation strategy is greater than zero, so they are willing to choose to cooperate. Evolution process.

If the conditions are not established, the three-party game model does not have a unique Nash equilibrium stable solution at this time. The government, the enterprise and the poor households will adopt a mixed strategy, that is, adopt a pure strategy under a certain probability.

5.2. Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium

Assume that the company adopts strategy E_1 (actively assisting) with a probability of X_1 and adopts strategy E_2 (not actively assisting) with a probability of $(1-X_1)$; the poor households adopt the strategy with the probability of X_2 and $(1-X_2)$ respectively P_1 (accepted) and strategy P_2 (not accepted); the government adopts strategy G_1 (regulation) and strategy G_2 (non-regulation) with the probability of X_3 and $(1-X_3)$ respectively, where $0\leq X_1, X_2, X_3\leq1$. The expected benefits of all parties when adopting different strategies are as follows:

$$E_{E1}(X_1, X_2, X_3) = X_3[X_2(R_E^* - C_E^* + I_E) + (1 - X_2)(-C_E^* + I_E)] + (1 - X_3)[X_2(R_E^* - C_E^*) + (1 - X_2)(-C_E^*)] = X_2 R_E^* + X_3 I_E - C_E^* \tag{1}$$

$$\begin{aligned} E_{E2}(X_1, X_2, X_3) &= X_3[X_2(R_E - C_E - L_E) + (1 - X_2)(-C_E - L_E)] \\ &\quad + (1 - X_3)[X_2(R_E - C_E) + (1 - X_2)(-C_E) \\ &= X_2 R_E + X_3 L_E - C_E \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

$$\begin{aligned} E_{P1}(X_1, X_2, X_3) &= X_3[X_1(R_P + I_P) + (1 - X_1)R_P^*] + (1 - X_3)[X_1 R_P + (1 - X_1)R_P^*] \\ &= X_1 X_3 R_P^* + X_1 R_P + (1 - X_1)R_P^* \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

$$E_{P2}(X_1, X_2, X_3) = 0 \tag{4}$$

$$\begin{aligned} E_{G1}(X_1, X_2, X_3) &= X_1[X_2(-C_G - C_G^* - I_P - I_E) + (1 - X_2)(-C_G - C_G^* - I_E)] \\ &\quad + (1 - X_1)[X_2(L_E - C_G - L_G - C_G^*) + (1 - X_2)(L_E - C_G - L_G - C_G^*)] \\ &= -X_1 X_2 I_P + X_1(-I_E - L_E + L_G) + (C_G + C_G^* + L_E - L_G) \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

$$\begin{aligned} E_{G1}(X_1, X_2, X_3) &= X_1[X_2 \times 0 + (1 - X_2) \times 0] + (1 - X_1)[X_2(-L_G)] + (1 - X_2)(-L_G) \\ &= (1 - X_1)L_G \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

For the three parties, when the expectations are all equal under different selection strategies, then the game reaches an equilibrium state, and X_1, X_2, X_3 can be obtained:

$$\text{When } E_{G1} = E_{G2}; \text{ then; } X_1 = \frac{(L_E - C_G - C_G^*)}{I_E} + L_E + X_2 I_P; \tag{7}$$

$$\text{When } E_{E1} = E_{E2}; \text{ then; } X_2 = [X_3(I_E + L_E) + C_E - C_E^*]/(R_E - R_E^*); \tag{8}$$

$$\text{When } E_{P1} = E_{P2}; \text{ then; } X_3 = [X_1(R_P^* - R_P) - R_P^*]/(X_1 I_P); \tag{9}$$

From the previous game profit matrix, it is obvious that unless there is enough L_E, the government can choose a regulatory strategy from the perspective of a rational economic man. Otherwise, it is more inclined to non-regulation. Regulators such as the government, in social development, may not completely choose from the perspective of a rational economic man to make strategic choices but actively adopt some measures to guide the society to develop in a certain direction that conforms to the national conditions. As a result, it does not do X_3. Regarding the analysis of rational economic man, the focus is on in-depth analysis of factors that affect the possibility of enterprises and poor households actively participating in the implementation of targeted poverty alleviation policies.

5.2.1. Analysis of X_2 Influencing Factors

It can be seen from formula (8) that X_2 is an increasing function of I_E, L_E, $C_E-C_E^*$ and X_3. When the I_E or L_E increases, it means that the government will increase the punishment or increase the subsidy level of the enterprise, which can make the enterprise more inclined to choose active assistance. When the $C_E-C_E^*$ decreases, it means that the cost gap between the active support strategy and the non-active support strategy is gradually reduced or even more cost-saving. The cost reduction is also subsidized, and the company will also be more inclined to choose active support strategy. In either case, with the country's focus on precise poverty alleviation, many enterprises and other organizations capable of providing assistance will join the action ranks. The possibility of poor households receiving assistance services X_2 increases, the continuous improvement and increase of poverty alleviation work will also increase with it.

X_2 is the decreasing function of $R_E-R_E^*$. $R_E-R_E^*$ indicates the income difference between the company's active assistance services and the non-active assistance services. The increase in $R_E-R_E^*$ means that the income of providing active assistance services is less than that of providing non-active assistance services ($R_E > R_E^*$), or the income is increasing more and more slowly. Then, in this case, the enterprise side is willing to provide active assistance. The enthusiasm of supporting services will decrease, leading to the reduction of the enterprises' active assistance services during the implementation of the targeted poverty alleviation policy. Due to the shortage of supply, the cost rises and ultimately the poor households' enthusiasm for choosing active assistance services decreases.

5.2.2. Analysis of X_1 Influencing Factors

Here, formula (9) is rewritten:

$$X_1 = 1/[1 - (\frac{R_P + X_3 I_P}{R_{P_*}})] \tag{10}$$

Because X_1 is an increasing function of R_P, I_P and X_3. More R_P means that the income of poor households when they choose to accept active poverty alleviation increases, so rational poor households will tend to choose to receive active assistance services. When the I_P increases, the poor households can also receive a certain number of subsidies from the government because they enjoy the poverty alleviation experience brought by the active assistance services, so that the poor households are more willing to accept active assistance to solve the problem of poverty alleviation. When X_3 increases, the probability of government supervision increases, and the probability of poor households receiving subsidies from the regulator also increases. The willingness of poor households to choose to receive active assistance will be greater. Regardless of the above-mentioned situations, poor households are more willing to choose to receive active assistance services. Therefore, affected by the needs of poor households, the probability of enterprises providing active assistance services will increase.

At the same time, X_1 is a decreasing function of R_P^*. R_P^* is the income of poor households who choose not to actively support services. When the R_P^* increases, the poor households are more inclined to provide services when the enterprise does not actively help. The motivation of the enterprise to actively help the poor is increased, and the probability of the enterprise to actively assist the service decreases. As a result, the probability of companies providing active assistance services will decrease. In addition, when $X_3=1$, the government supervises the deployment of targeted poverty alleviation activities, increases subsidies to encourage both enterprises and poor households to participate in the implementation of targeted poverty alleviation policies, and increases the response to inactive or evasive behaviors from enterprises. Punishment is used to speed up the construction of the assistance model of the enterprise in targeted poverty alleviation.

It can also be obtained from the mixed strategy that the participation enthusiasm of enterprises and poor households in the implementation of targeted poverty alleviation policies is positively related to the possibility of government supervision. If the government is from the perspective of economic man, it tends to not supervise, but the development and progress of enterprise assistance in targeted poverty alleviation is not in line with sustainable development. However, since the current reality still lacks the conditions for enterprises to actively choose active assistance, the most important thing is that the government can play an active guiding role to promote the positive development of assistance in targeted poverty alleviation.

6. Summary and Suggestions

6.1. Article Conclusion

Under China's historical traditions and actual national conditions, the government's unified regulation and supervision take advantage of the company's abundant resources and other advantages, fully participate in the specific assistance process of the targeted poverty alleviation macro-policies, and promote the development of local poor households out of poverty. The article analyzes by constructing a three-party game model of government, enterprise and poor households, and draws the following conclusions:

(1) The pure strategy Nash equilibrium analysis shows that although there is an optimal strategy combination (actively assisting, accepting, and not supervising), its establishment condition is that it cannot be realized in a short period of time. Therefore, the three-party game model does not have a unique Nash equilibrium stable solution.

(2) The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium analysis shows that by setting more reasonable subsidy measures, the enthusiasm of enterprises and poor households to participate in the implementation of targeted poverty alleviation can be greatly mobilized. The tripartite game model has the only stable solution of Nash equilibrium on the industry side. The participation enthusiasm of poor households in the implementation of targeted poverty alleviation policies is positively related to the possibility of government supervision.

6.2. Analysis of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium

The relationship between the three parties is close and inseparable, interacting and influencing each other.

Therefore, the following suggestions are made for the three parties:

(1) Because the government and other regulators will greatly affect the participation of enterprises and poor households in participating in the implementation of targeted poverty alleviation, the regulator should implement supervision in a reasonable manner. In fact, in the process of targeted poverty alleviation, the local government still lacks this complete basic poverty alleviation organization. The rural cadres who precisely connect with poor households are equivalent to part-time jobs in their poverty alleviation positions. They are unstable but unable to penetrate their specific jobs. In the environment, it will cause work to be distracted. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a special precision poverty alleviation department or agency. At the same time, it is necessary to arrange full-time personnel to be responsible for its work and to strengthen supervision. Whether it is a unit or the people, they must actively guide them to participate in the supervision and work the process is transparent and open in real time. New regulatory models can be created, a complete and reasonable regulatory control mechanism can be constructed, digital information technology can be reasonably applied, and full attention should be paid to the training of regulatory personnel.

(2) The enterprise may purchase agricultural products from poor households or hire poor households to work and conduct employment training. Let local leading companies become leading role models. For example, the placement of labor security posts, job training for corresponding positions, technical guidance for the cultivation of crops, and education of hard work thinking can also be conducted. At the same time, we must make full use of the various conveniences provided by the Internet era so that in the process of assistance, the rapid development of information and the improvement of technology can be used to integrate the two to maximize benefits and reduce costs.

(3) The poor households should also actively participate in the assistance activities of the enterprises and take positive actions. In addition to accepting the assistance of the national government and enterprises, they must also work hard to change their ideological concepts of "usage". Poor households need to be able to give full play to their own initiative to change the status quo and solve the poverty problem fundamentally. It is also necessary to strengthen the emphasis on education, whether it is self-study or teaching to the children of the family, and strive to establish the spirit of "self-reliance". Accepting material assistance cannot truly get rid of poverty since material assistance is often short-lived and voluntary is the only effective approach to get rid of poverty and achieve sustainable development.

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